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Abstract In the face of global environmental change, a key question for the social
sciences is how to organize the co-evolution of societies and their natural environment. In
this context, a new long-term research program, the Earth System Governance Project,
proposes several key issues to be examined: architecture, agency, adaptiveness, account-
ability, and allocation and access. The contributions to this special issue have focused on
the analytical problem of agency. For example, they have examined newly emerging or
understudied agents of global environmental governance, or offered a fresh assessment of
agency in the context of existing governance mechanisms such as the Clean Development
Mechanism. This concluding article outlines several insights provided by the contributions
to this special issue regarding four key questions underlying the study of agency in global
environmental governance. First, they call attention to the ingredients or processes that
characterize agency in the first place and thus distinguish actors from agents. Secondly, the
authors highlight the differences among agents and how they interact with each other.
Thirdly, they point toward variation in the ways that agents may acquire authority. Finally,
the contributions to this special issue suggest that there may be several approaches to
evaluating agency, with different consequences. Thus, taken together, the contributions to
this special issue provide a starting point for broadening our understanding of agency in
earth system governance.
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1 Introduction
Global environmental change—that is large-scale changes in the biophysical and bio-
geochemical environment caused (or influenced) by natural developments and/or human
activities—affects the capacity of traditional public actors such as governments to ade-
quately address the emerging challenges of mitigation and adaptation. As a result, global
environmental change has triggered the emergence of new actors, as well as shifts in the
role and relevance of established ones. Whether states are still able to perform their core
functions under the conditions of rapid and large-scale earth system transformation, and to
what extent and at what cost non-state actors are complementing or even substituting
central governance functions, remain open questions. Such developments have led to an
increasing interest in the analytical problem of agency in earth system governance in recent
years (Biermann et al. 2009a). For example, the contributions to this special issue have
demonstrated the relevance of both public and private agency in the context of the Clean
Development Mechanism (CDM), and the ways in which global environmental change has
encouraged the emergence of new agents such as social entrepreneurs and environmental
consultancy firms. At the same time, these agents also shape norms and values, and thus
encourage particular perspectives on global environmental change and its solutions, while
marginalizing others.
This concluding article identifies some common issues that run throughout the contri-
butions to this special issue and examines their implications for our understanding of
agency and its relevance in earth system governance. First, we provide an overview of the
state-of-the-art in research related to actors/agents in the global change issue area (see also
Biermann and Pattberg 2008). Secondly, we highlight the individual contributions of each
article to four guiding questions outlined in our opening editorial to this issue: (1) What is
agency for earth system governance? (2) Who are the agents of earth system governance?
(3) How is agency exercised in earth system governance? (4) And finally, how can we
evaluate the impacts and effects of agents/agency in earth system governance?1 By
addressing these questions, the contributions to this special issue broaden our under-
standing of agency in earth system governance. We conclude our contribution by identi-
fying a number of possible directions for refining the research agenda on agency in earth
system governance.
2 Understanding agency in earth system governance
The analytical problem of agency begins with the assumption that the credibility, stability,
adaptiveness, and inclusiveness of earth system governance is affected by a wide range of
actors, including national governments and their bureaucracies as well as the growing
population of non-state actors, such as environmental organizations, expert networks, and
1 These questions are based on the Science and Implementation Plan of the Earth System Governance
Project (Biermann et al. 2009a); see also (Biermann et al. 2010).
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corporations. The latter are particularly important as global environmental change chal-
lenges the capacity of traditional state structures to effectively govern, particularly when
many of the activities that give rise to global change fall outside the sovereign authority of
the state (Biermann and Dingwerth 2004; Bulkeley and Newell 2010; Marauhn 2007).
Within this context, a growing number of scholars have voiced their concern about the
problem-solving capacity of the state and the international state-system. Increasingly,
scholars and practitioners alike acknowledge that solutions to the challenges of global
change do not exclusively originate from public sources (governments and international
organizations such as the United Nations), but are co-produced by a host of non-state actors
whose authority is contested and whose legitimacy is questionable (Ba¨ckstrand and Lo¨v-
brand 2006; Cutler et al. 1999; Dingwerth 2007; Hall and Biersteker 2002; Jagers and
Stripple 2003; Pattberg 2005a, 2007; Pattberg and Stripple 2008). As a result, the overall
architecture of global environmental governance has been described as increasingly
fragmented and multi-layered (Biermann et al. 2009), potentially leading to a number of
both conflictive and synergetic overlaps and interlinkages that co-determine the problem-
solving capacity of the entire global governance system.
Research on agency in earth system governance considers the capacity of public actors
(at local, national and international levels) to respond to global change and how this
capacity may be changing. In addition, research on agency focuses on the extent to which
non-state actors are responding to new governance demands created by earth system
transformation. Ultimately, we are concerned with understanding the changing nature of
authority in earth system governance and answering the questions of ‘‘who governs for
whom and how and to what effect?’’
Related to this interest in the reconfiguration of authority, the Earth System Governance
Project’s Science Plan distinguishes between actors and agents in earth system governance.
While actors refer to the individuals, organizations, and networks that participate in
decision-making processes, agents are actors who have the ability to prescribe behavior
(Biermann et al. 2009a, p. 38). Hence, agents are authoritative actors, where authority is
understood as the ability to exercise power with legitimacy. This suggests that agency
involves a particular relationship between actors and those whom they seek to govern
(Avant et al. 2010). In order to become an agent, an actor must make claims as to why they
should be empowered to govern. For state actors, such legitimacy claims may rest on their
control over the institutions of the state and monopoly on the use of force. For non-state
actors, legitimacy claims may appeal to moral arguments, expertise, participation, or
problem-solving ability (Avant et al. 2010; Hall and Biersteker 2002). These claims may
be accepted formally and explicitly (through delegation) or implicitly and informally
(through recognition).
However, the degree to which authority is uncontested in order to qualify as legitimate
remains an empirical question. For example, if citizens are unaware of the work of social
entrepreneurs or global environmental consultancies even though it may affect them, they
cannot give consent. Does such a failure to contest agency nonetheless render it legitimate?
Similarly, linking agency to consent raises issues concerning the identification of the actors
or groups that need to consent to an agent for it to possess legitimacy. Indeed, a definition
of agency that defines it as consensual might exclude any example of agency that is
contested and not universally accepted. Furthermore, as will be elaborated later on, the
contributions to this special issue also indicate that consent is not the only source of
authority and legitimacy for agents in earth system governance. In sum, as Pattberg and
Stripple (2008), pp. 273–274 note, agency can be understood as ‘‘the capacity of individual
and collective actors to change the course of events or the outcome of processes’’, provided
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that this capacity is based on authority and not brute force. We revisit some of these
definitional issues below.
While the concepts of agency and agent have mainly been proposed to describe and
analyze who is contributing to earth system governance, they also carry a more theoretical
connotation. In principal-agent theory, an agency relation is one ‘‘in which a ‘principal’
delegates authority to an ‘agent’ to perform some service for the principal’’ (Kiser 1999,
p. 146). Such agency relations exist in a wide variety of contexts, for example, between
voters and politicians, employers and employees or shareholders and managers. As Kiser
notes (1999, p. 146), the ‘‘key feature of all agency relations is that once principals
delegate authority to agents, they often have problems controlling them…’’. While prin-
cipal-agent theory might shed some light on specific agents in earth system governance, for
example international bureaucracies (see Biermann and Siebenhu¨ner 2009), agents and
agency in earth system governance, in our understanding, should not be seen as depending
on principals per se. A number of agents acquire authority without being formally dele-
gated with this authority. For example, social entrepreneurs do not act on behalf of a
concrete principal, but attempt to influence the outcome of earth system governance as
independent agents.
Related to this point, in our understanding, agency ‘‘is neither fully located in the public
sphere of governments and intergovernmental organizations nor in the private sphere of
non-governmental organizations and business actors. It rather emerges in different geog-
raphies and at different times as a crucial mix of public and private resources, roles and
responsibilities’’ (Stripple and Pattberg 2010, p. 138). Furthermore, agents contribute to
earth system governance indirectly by influencing the decisions of others, or directly by
steering those who have given their consent to be governed (implicitly or explicitly).
Research on agency thus asks: who are the agents of earth system governance, how do they
become authoritative, and to what effect?
Previous research on global environmental governance that is of relevance for the
analytical perspective of agency includes at least three areas of concern. First, a broader
theoretical debate has emerged about the usefulness of distinguishing between public and
private modes of governance and adequate typologies reflecting this distinction (Pattberg
and Stripple 2008; Andonova et al. 2009; Stripple and Pattberg 2010). Pattberg and
Stripple (2008) have proposed to map environmental governance arrangements according
to the actor constellation and the primary mode of governance employed. While actor
constellations range from purely public to hybrid and exclusively private, modes of gov-
ernance include networks and markets in addition to hierarchical steering (in the form of
government and intergovernmental organizations) (Pattberg and Stripple 2008, p. 373).
Alternatively, Andonova et al. (2009) have introduced a typology of transnational gov-
ernance that differentiates between actor constellations and the governance functions of
information provision, capacity building and implementation, and rule-setting. The con-
tributions to this special issue also address the challenge of distinguishing between dif-
ferent typologies of agents, as they include various examples of agency exercised through
different modes of governance, such as, private, public, or hybrid governance; networked,
market-driven, or community-based governance.
Second, empirical research has focused on the influence of non-governmental organi-
zations in international decision-making processes (Betsill and Corell 2008). Based on a
long-standing debate about the increased relevance of non-state actors in global politics
(Arts et al. 2001; Hall and Biersteker 2002; Higgott et al. 2000), scholars have been
interested in the conditions of effective non-state influence in international negotiations. A
corresponding research line has addressed the autonomous influence of non-state actors
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such as global corporations (e.g. Falkner 2007) and international bureaucracies (Biermann
and Siebenhu¨ner 2009) on global politics. The proliferation of non-state actors and their
measurable influences in earth system governance has resulted in a sustained debate about
the relevance of the state under the conditions of earth system transformation (e.g. Bier-
mann and Dingwerth 2004; Mathews 1997; Raustiala 1997). The influence of non-state
actors is also revisited by the contributions to this special issue, for example through
examinations of agency exercised by civil society actors and private corporations.
Third, a number of scholars have recently argued for a re-conceptualization of con-
temporary global environmental governance in light of an increasing density of border-
spanning private and public-private governance mechanisms that aim at independent rule-
making rather than at influencing the decisions of states and international organization
(Pattberg and Stripple 2008; Okereke et al. 2009). This ‘‘transnationalization’’ of global
environmental governance has also led to increased interest in questions of effectiveness
and legitimacy of non-state environmental governance (Ba¨ckstrand 2006; Dingwerth and
Pattberg 2007; Fuchs and Kalfagianni 2009; Gulbrandsen 2009). Taken together, these
three areas of interest provide ample vantage points for researching agency in earth system
governance. In sum, by reflecting on how concrete empirical examples of private or hybrid
governance can be analyzed from the perspective of agency, the articles in this special
issue not only contribute to broadening our empirical understanding of earth system
governance, but also contribute to a renewed theoretical interest in questions of agency
within the discipline of International Relations and beyond.
3 What is agency for earth system governance?
Before engaging in empirical research on the agents of earth system governance, we must
possess a better conceptual understanding of agency, of how agents differ from actors, and
what constitutes agency in the context of earth system governance. The term ‘agency’ is
widely used across the social sciences and humanities (Dharwadkar et al. 2000; Eisenhardt
1989; Eisner et al. 1996), and it would be useful to draw on these fields to consider the core
elements of agency for earth system governance. For example, how is agency for earth
system governance defined? While earlier work on agency in earth system governance has
converged toward some agreement on the meaning of agency in this context, a number of
questions remain unanswered. Thus, agency could be understood as the capacity to act in
the face of earth system transformation or to produce effects that ultimately shape natural
processes. Agency in earth system governance may be considered exclusively as con-
tributing to problem-solving, while alternatively, agency could well include the negative
consequences of the authority to act. It may be useful to consider agency as a dynamic trait
that can be created and lost and to explore how this is shaped by environmental change. If
agency is dynamic, is it zero-sum in that as some actors gain agency in a policy domain
others lose agency? Or can agency be shared across actors? It is also important to consider
the possibility of non-human agency in the realm of earth system governance. In some
fields, non-human entities such as technology are considered to have agency. This is
particularly relevant for energy technology and infrastructure choices that will have life
times of several decades and can create path-dependency and carbon lock-in, thereby
limiting the agency of future generations. In short, in a coupled human-natural system,
does the natural world exercise or influence agency, and if so how?
The contributions to this special issue address some of these questions. In particular,
they highlight a key attribute that distinguishes agents from actors: in addition to proposing
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solutions to environmental problems and implementing them, agents can shape broader
norms and values relating to earth system governance. For example, social entrepreneurs
(Partzsch and Ziegler 2011) both redefine the state’s hydraulic mission to be more
inclusive of social and environmental concerns, as well as proposing and implementing
concrete solutions to local water use issues. Similarly, global environmental consultancy
firms identify environmental problems and develop solutions, but are also influential in
outlining what practices and solutions are deemed appropriate in the first place (Bouteligier
2011). And, as discussed by Rindefja¨ll et al. (2011), in defining the criteria for sustainable
development that CDM projects must meet, government bureaucracies in countries such as
Chile are able to define to what extent this mechanism is used as a tool for sustainable
development, or whether it is instead primarily used to attract investment. This also
indicates that agency is not necessarily about problem-solving, but may potentially (and
intentionally) also have ambivalent or even undesirable effects on sustainable develop-
ment. Thus, instead of equating agency with effective problem-solving (which is prob-
lematic, as any failed attempt at exercising agency would be excluded, as would agency
with unintended side-effects), it might be better to examine and categorize the types of
goals that are pursued by agents.
Furthermore, the contributions to this special issue do suggest that, at least to some
extent, there may be trade-offs or mutual growth in agency between different actors. The
social entrepreneurs studied by Partzsch and Ziegler (2011) may become change agents
due to their capacity to respond to the failure of the state in adequately implementing or
solving the problems resulting from the dominant water governance paradigm or ‘‘mis-
sion’’. Thus, in this case, the work of social entrepreneurs can either undermine the state
actors promoting the hydraulic mission, or work in tandem with them. However, agency
should not necessarily be understood as a zero-sum game; in fact, new agents can emerge
on the scene without diminishing the agency of other established agents. The example of
environmental consultancy firms (Bouteligier 2011) illustrates that actors can acquire
agency without diminishing the agency of others, for example the large corporations who
are the clients of environmental consultancies. Indeed, while environmental consultancy
firms may constrain actors by promoting particular standards and best practices, they can
also strengthen the agency of others as they increase their capacity to act. The observation
that interaction between different agents may mutually enhance their agency is also sup-
ported by the case of stakeholder networks in India, where the ties and interactions may
increase the capacity of multiple actors in a network to contribute to stronger use of wind
power potential in a state (Benecke 2011). Similarly, the social entrepreneurs examined by
Partzsch and Ziegler (2011) may function as transition agents, in that a key goal for them is
empowering local communities, thus eventually transferring agency to them.
4 Who are the agents of earth system governance?
A second fundamental question with regard to agency in earth system governance is the
following: who ultimately governs the earth system? We need to go beyond identifying the
myriad actors that participate in governance processes related to the earth system and
instead focus on how some actors gain and exercise agency. To do so, we need to gain
insight into the following questions: How is agency configured in different policy domains
related to earth system governance? And is it configured differently at different levels of
governance? Who are the key agents in a particular issue area and how are they related to
one another? To what extent is the state (at all levels) an agent of earth system governance?
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Are all states agents of earth system governance or does it vary according to broader
structures in the international system (for example the North-South divide)? How is the
agency of states reconfigured as non-state actors become agents, especially at local,
regional and international levels of governance? What broad types of agents are central in
the area of earth system governance and can we develop a useful typology? Finally, do
elements of the coupled human-natural system such as ecosystems and markets exercise
agency in establishing and undertaking earth system governance? Existing research
engages with a number of these questions, for example by pointing out how some states
may find their autonomy affected to a far greater extent by private governance than others
(Falkner 2003). Another key issue that is emphasized throughout the literature is that the
ongoing reconfigurations of agency challenge discrete, dichotomous categories, such as
‘‘state’’ and ‘‘non-state’’ and ‘‘public’’ and ‘‘private’’ (Betsill and Bulkeley 2006; Pattberg
2005b; Pattberg and Stripple 2008).
The observation that categories of agents, such as states, business and civil society, are
neither distinct nor uniform is further substantiated in several contributions to this special
issue. For example, while the key agents examined by Partzsch and Ziegler (2011)—social
entrepreneurs—are clearly identified as non-state actors, the authors underline that they
cannot be equated with either privatization or market-oriented goals. Thus, while social
entrepreneurship is often framed as neo-liberal, they find that even where social entre-
preneurs are associated with processes of privatization, this is often a different, more
communally focused form of privatization. Such discussions highlight the difficulty not
only of advancing our understanding of what non-state actors are, but also distinguishing
between different types of non-state actors.
A different example comes from the renewable energy sector in India, in this case the
wind power sector. Rather than focusing on individual agents of renewable energy gov-
ernance such as public actors and corporations, Benecke (2011) argues for a broader
understanding of agency by highlighting the networked character of stakeholder relations.
On this account, agency emerges out of the cooperation of manifold individual actors, who
each become agents in their own right while the network among them predominantly
provides the resources through which they develop agency.
The case of the CDM in Chile reminds us that the implications of the governance
transformation for the role of the state are also not unambiguous, and furthermore, different
states and state agencies may pursue vastly different strategies and outcomes within the
context of the CDM (Rindefja¨ll et al. 2011). Thus, while the CDM is often presented as an
example of hybrid governance and increasing involvement of private actors in climate
governance, state actors retain a significant role in shaping CDM projects. And, while some
states may use it to further goals relating to environmental and social sustainability, others
may see it more narrowly as a tool to attract investment. The two contributions focusing on
the Clean Development Mechanism also illustrate how state actors shape the framework
within which the CDM operates, for example by influencing the extent to which the CDM
is a tool for emissions reductions, attracts investment or realizes environmental and social
benefits. Nonetheless, within this framework, many more actors exercise agency by
influencing the extent to which the CDM potential is used (Benecke 2011). In this way,
both state and non-state actors may exercise agency regarding different aspects of the
CDM.
In relation to the question of how agency in earth system governance is configured, all
contributions to this special issue highlight the crucial mix of public, non-profit, and for-
profit motivations in developing norms and implementing concrete solutions. On this
account, agency is understood as a relational phenomenon, as it emerges out of the
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interaction of different actors controlling varying resources, rather than being a predefined
characteristic of any particular actor. As a consequence, agency cannot be equated with
some static quality of an actor, but rather emerges out of the time- and space-specific
interaction of various actors.
5 How is agency exercised in earth system governance?
We can expect that different agents become authoritative on different grounds, so it is
important to inquire into the sources of authority. Research in this area could explore how
power and authority are configured across types of governance arrangements as well as the
changing nature of state-based power and authority as new actors become agents of earth
system governance. Thus, while states are often seen as the ultimate source of power and
authority, existing research suggests that there is a need to explore alternative ways of
understanding power, for example suggesting that even the recognition of an actor as an
‘‘expert’’ grants authority to some, while excluding others (Okereke et al. 2009). This
research question also highlights new forms of governance beyond state-based institutions,
which may operate on the basis of different sources and degrees of authority (such as
consent from customers or other firms in the field, or recognition via statements made at
intergovernmental meetings). These include markets, certification schemes, self-regulation,
public-private partnerships, and transnational networks (Bernstein (forthcoming); Bern-
stein et al. 2010; Betsill and Bulkeley 2006; Dingwerth 2007; Gulbrandsen 2009; Pattberg
2005b).
There is a need to document these various forms of governance through which actors
exercise agency and to understand how the process of governing varies across governance
architectures, and, as the contributions to this special issue indicate, there are more
examples of (potential) agents that are not yet studied to the same extent as some of the
above. To do so, we need to better understand the following: What are the conditions for
the emergence of agency at different levels and within different architectures? Does agency
change over time, and, if so, how does this change occur? What are the drivers of changes
in agency? Are they internal to the agent, external, or a combination of the two? What is
the relationship between governance as a process and agency?
The contributions to this special issue reiterate that the sources of authority for agents
are diverse: while public actors may for example expect their control over state institutions
to invest them with authority, private actors may carve out other sources of authority for
themselves. In some cases, authority may arise where agents are more participatory,
accountable, and inclusive than public actors, for example through their local embedd-
edness and educational efforts (Partzsch and Ziegler 2011). This case thus illustrates that
there is no simple dichotomy between public actors that by default have authority, and non-
state actors that inherently lack it. Instead, as is the case in the communal hydraulic
mission, they may have authority precisely because they respond to the shortcomings of the
elected government, for example regarding the involvement of local populations.
However, the contributions to this special issue place more emphasis on the capacity of
agents to promote change or provide solutions as a source of authority: environmental
consultancy firms identify environmental problems and potential solutions (Bouteligier
2011), social entrepreneurs are ‘change agents’ promoting innovation (Partzsch and
Ziegler 2011), and stakeholder networks may acquire authority by effectively and effi-
ciently making use of existing conditions to promote the use of renewable energy (Benecke
2011).
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As this discussion indicates, establishing authority is closely tied to questions of
legitimacy. In addition to behavior conforming to accepted norms and procedures (such as
participation) and effective and efficient problem-solving, a further source of authority that
is highlighted in several contributions to this special issue is the mere recognition of an
agent’s expertise, knowledge, or innovative capacity. For example, ‘social entrepreneurs’
may see their authority enhanced by fact that this title is bestowed on them, in addition to
the recognition of their work in the form of awards and prizes (Partzsch and Ziegler 2011).
Similarly, environmental consultancy firms may gain agency when they are recognized as
innovative and knowledgeable (Bouteligier 2011), and participants in stakeholder networks
mutually enhance each other’s agency by fostering reputation and social capital (Benecke
2011). The importance of recognition cannot be overstated: an environmental consultancy
firm, for example, may have substantial knowledge and resources, but unless potential
customers acknowledge this and make use of its services, it is quite limited in its ability to
influence earth system governance. Thus, in summary, the source of authority underpin-
ning agency may be found in agents’ capacity to be more responsive and participatory than
public institutions, in the unresponsiveness of state bureaucracies, in effective and efficient
problem-solving and finally in their ability to gain the recognition of key audiences as
innovative and successful problem-solvers.
Conversely, the state departments in the Chilean case examined by Rindefja¨ll et al.
(2011) are not particularly inclusive (a number of civil society actors, for example, dis-
agree with the strategy promoted by the responsible state actors) and they do not exercise
agency to implement change, but rather to protect a narrowly defined national strategy
(although the opposite is conceivable too, where a broader definition of sustainable
development is adopted). In this case, the source of authority is not clearly related to any of
the above examples, but rather the legally binding nature of the sustainable development
criteria they develop for CDM projects.
Furthermore, the cases also highlight that while agents have the capacity to shape the
governance structures within which they operate, the existing framework and dominant
norms also shape their roles and capacities. In this sense, they also respond to broader
discussions in the social sciences, such as the ‘‘structure-agent’’ debate (Giddens 1984;
Wendt 1999). Thus, as outlined by Rindefja¨ll et al. (2011), stronger host countries for
CDM projects have a greater opportunity to be picky about the social and environmental
implications of the projects they attract as they are generally more attractive for investment
than the poorest countries, which are instead likely to set lower standards to attract any
investment at all. At the same time, the market-based structure of the CDM and the fact
that sustainable development is not rewarded also encourages the use of this mechanism as
a tool to attract investment. In the case of renewable energy governance in India (Benecke
2011), existing state–market relations and the attributes of individual actors that make up
the broader stakeholder network limit the agency in the respective policy field. Finally, the
social entrepreneurs discussed by Partzsch and Ziegler (2011) are affected by the currently
predominant water governance paradigm. At the same time, these agents also contribute to
redefining existing structures, as is particularly well illustrated by the social entrepreneurs
reacting to perceived problems in the dominant water governance paradigm. The example
of environmental consultancy firms (Bouteligier 2011) also illustrates that multiple
structural transformations can be at work, (re-)configuring authority in earth system gov-
ernance. In this specific case, both the widening and the deepening of the Information Age
as well as the increased density of national and international regulatory frameworks have
enabled environmental consultancy firms to become agents of earth system governance.
Agency in earth system governance 93
123
6 How can we evaluate agents and agency?
The effectiveness of different agents and their various means of exercising agency (for
example through public-private partnerships or market-based instruments) are not suffi-
ciently understood. Most advances in the study of earth system governance have focused
on states as core actors and on intergovernmental forms of cooperation. This leads us to ask
the following: How can we assess the effectiveness of different agents and their various
means of exercising agency? Can we apply approaches developed in the study of insti-
tutions, such as output-outcome-impact, to agency? Should an evaluation of agent effec-
tiveness focus on environmental outcomes, behavioral changes or effects on knowledge
and discourse? Can we arrive at a Pareto efficiency of agency? In other words, can we
decipher what the optimal number of different agents would be to achieve the highest level
of effectiveness in terms of preventing, mitigating or adapting to global environmental
change while, at the same time, protecting human livelihoods? In existing studies, agency
is rarely evaluated explicitly from the perspective of effectiveness, while a focus on the
sources of legitimacy of different agents is prominent (Ba¨ckstrand 2006; Dingwerth 2007).
The cases presented in the contributions to this special issue highlight a number of
further challenges that need to be addressed in attempts to assess the effectiveness of
different agents and means of exercising agency. The example of the CDM in Chile
highlights that while state departments might be the key agents in defining the sustainable
development criteria applied to CDM projects, the approach they favor may not necessarily
be the most desirable in terms of environmental outcomes (Rindefja¨ll et al. 2011). If we
compare this exercise in agency according to the intended goal of the state actor defining
the sustainable development criteria, which in this case is increasing investment, we might
very well conclude that it is an effective exercise of agency, as the number of CDM
projects in Chile suggests. However, if we compare to a broader definition of sustainable
development rather than the one agreed upon nationally, then, in terms of both environ-
mental and social outcomes, this exercise of agency seems less effective. The study on
social entrepreneurs (Partzsch and Ziegler 2011) touches on similar questions: in this case,
the presence or lack of innovation is the single most relevant criterion defining social
entrepreneurs as change agents. However, innovation alone is no guarantee for successful
results. While the above examples point to the problem of defining what results are to be
deemed successful, agency can also have unintended or negative effects. This issue is in
particular raised in the context of environmental consultancy firms, some of which have
been accused of issuing assessments or implementing standards that amount to ‘green-
wash’ of unsustainable practices (Bouteligier 2011).
In the case of renewable energy governance in India (Benecke 2011), the case study
presented in this special issue has clearly demonstrated that a number of factors determine
the effectiveness of renewable energy service delivery. In particular, intensive and well-
institutionalized state–market relations together with a certain quality of interactions (for
example a minimum level of trust among the stakeholders) increase the likelihood of
effective implementation. Successful agency is thus dependent on structural factors that are
at least partially outside the control of the agents.
However, as the article on environmental consultancies (Bouteligier 2011) confirms,
measuring the effectiveness of agency is not an easy task, in particular in the early phase of
a developing research program. As agency as an analytical category in earth system
governance research is slowly gaining ground, scholars seem to be interested predomi-
nantly in indentifying novel agents in earth system governance and the corresponding
governance instruments and arrangements (for example, social entrepreneurs and
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environmental consultancy firms). Consequently, the next phase of agency research should
focus, at least to some extent, on measuring observable effects of agency in earth system
governance. The contributions to this special issue do indicate that outlining the effects of
agency is possible, for example by utilizing an output-outcome-impact distinction. This is
most explicitly done to illustrate the effects of stakeholder networks in the wind energy
sector in India (Benecke 2011), showing, for example, that they may have an influence on
framework conditions, which lead to more implementation practices and additional support
for wind energy. The activities of social entrepreneurs (Partzsch and Ziegler 2011) also
have varied effects, ranging from institutional change, to addressing water access or water
pollution, which may be analyzed within such a framework. What is still lacking are
broader conceptualizations of the effects of agency in earth system governance that would
allow for large-scale comparative assessments across different types of agency.
7 Conclusion
The contributions to this special issue advance our understanding of agency in earth system
governance by addressing several of the key questions posed in the Science and Imple-
mentation Plan of the Earth System Governance project (Biermann et al. 2009) and out-
lined in more detail in this concluding article. They also provide some practical guidance
for scholars conducting research in this field as well as suggestions for future research. In
particular, we suggest the following elements as useful starting points for future research
on agency in earth system governance.
First, the study of agency in earth system governance requires identifying those actors
involved in a decision-making process who actively shape norms and values related to a
particular environmental issue, and/or identifying environmental problems and possible
solutions. Beginning with a catalog of the actors involved in a particular issue area may be
a useful first step, but research must go further and clarify which actors have become
authoritative within a given field. A further interesting question in this area concerns the
ways in which different agents constrain or enhance each other’s agency: as some of the
contributions to this special issue indicate, the interactions between agents may go in
multiple directions.
Second, on a related note, it would be useful to consider whether there are other aspects to
agency beyond shaping norms and values, defining problems and solutions. In any study of
agency, it is important to clarify on what basis agency is being identified in order to avoid
claims that agency is simply in the eye of the beholder. Scholars should be sure to clearly state
the criteria being used to distinguish actors from agents in particular cases of earth system
governance so that readers can challenge the assumptions underlying the criteria and/or
replicate findings. In addition to having clear criteria for distinguishing agents from actors,
researchers also need to be sensitive to varying degrees of agency and the general scope
conditions for agency. For example, it may be tempting to identify agents as those actors
which have implicit or explicit consent, or to focus on actors with the capacity to contribute to
problem-solving. However, focusing on these characteristics would leave a blind spot on
examples of failed agency, or unintentionally negative agency. Instead, we need to recognize
that the authority of agents can come from other sources as well, and will often be contested.
Third, scholars also need to consider the basis on which agents become authoritative.
All contributions to this special issue study examples of agency in earth system governance
where authority has been attained through consent that is either granted explicitly or
implicitly. Although the empirical studies presented in this special issue did not touch upon
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cases in which coercion is used to attain agency in earth system governance, this possibility
should not be entirely disregarded by the researcher. Future studies therefore should
attempt to unearth in particular those cases in which influence is achieved through coercion
rather than consent. Furthermore, a number of existing studies highlight that the authority
and legitimacy of many new, non-state actors in earth system governance remain con-
tested. It would be interesting to see to what extent a lack of legitimacy and consent affects
the exercise of agency.
Fourth, the contributions highlight the importance of understanding the interaction
between agents and structures, in particular the ways in which structures may enable or
constrain the exercise of agency. This line of inquiry could also incorporate issues of scale.
As agents contribute to shaping norms and values around an issue area at one level of
political jurisdiction, what are the implications at lower levels? Do these structures give
rise to new ‘‘sub-agents’’ who may in turn reshape or reinforce existing structures? Pos-
sibly, the relationship between state and non-state actors in the case of the CDM can be
seen as an example of agents and sub-agents, with the agent (in this case, the state) defining
the overall national framework for the CDM, while various sub-agents (state and non-state
actors) are responsible for the results that are achieved within this framework. In addition,
an attention to issues of scale could also address the question at which level of governance
agency is exercised most effectively.
Finally, future studies of agency in earth system governance should give careful con-
sideration to ways of evaluating the effectiveness of agents in earth system governance, as
this field of inquiry is a gap in current research. The contributions to this special issue
indicate that agency in earth system governance can not only be ineffective, but also have
negative implications or be used for goals other than addressing environmental change. In
particular, they highlight some of the challenges involved in conducting such evaluations,
which are perhaps similar to some of the early debates in evaluating the effectiveness of
international regimes. Particularly important in this respect are the criteria used for eval-
uating the effectiveness of agency: as the case of the CDM in Chile indicates, whether we
evaluate on the basis of goal attainment or successful problem-solving may lead to vastly
different evaluations of effectiveness. Future research could consider whether and how
developments from that literature can be used to strengthen evaluations of effectiveness in
the exercise of agency in earth system governance.
To conclude, research on agency in earth system governance, that is the multiple ways
in which actors acquire authority to affect the outcomes of earth system governance, is an
emerging field of inquiry within the larger attempt to understand the human dimensions of
global environmental change. Taken together, this special issue provides a starting point
for broadening our understanding of agency in earth system governance. While many
aspects of the concept of agency and its application to the field of earth system governance
will remain fuzzy and ambiguous in this early stage of the research program, we believe
that this special issue provides valuable vantage points, in the form of questions to be
asked, concepts to be explored and perspectives to be applied, for a fruitful exploration of
agency in earth system governance in the years to come.
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